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DR. FRANS J.G. PADT & JUAN CARLOS SANCHEZ*

Creating New Spaces for Sustainable
Water Management in the Senegal
River Basinl
ABSTRACT

The International Union for Nature Conservation has made considerable efforts to bring sustainable Integrated Water Resources Management into practice through its Water and Nature Initiative. In
doing so it faced major challenges such as institutional shortcomings, underdevelopment of the civil society, and a lack of participation. In this paper we review the experiences of the International
Union for Nature Conservation with the Water and Nature Initiative in the Senegal River Basin. Findings indicate the International
Union for Nature Conservation was able to open new spaces for sustainable IWRM by cautiously lobbying at high administrative levels
combined with community work on the ground.
I. INTRODUCTION

Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is a wellknown response to the global water crisis in contemporary water management.2 IWRM is defined as "a process which promotes the co-oriented development and management of water, land and related
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of
* Dr. Frans J.G. Padt is Senior Lecturer at The Pennsylvania State University (USA).
His research includes the political, institutional, and cultural aspects of natural resources

management. Juan Carlos Sanchez is Legal Officer at the International Union for Nature
Conservation, Environmental Law Centre in Bonn, Germany.
1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the workshop Water Policy
Dynamics in State-Centric Regimes organized by the Center for Development Research at
the University of Bonn (March 24-25, 2009). We would like to thank all our reviewers for
their comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks go to Jean-Marc Garreau, Matar Diouf of
IUCN West-Africa and Mark Smith of the IUCN Headquarters for providing essential
information. Finally we are grateful to Maria Augusta Le6n Moreta of the IUCN
Environmental Law Centre for the helpful comments and suggestions.
2. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Integrated Water Resources Mnnagement,WATER
FoR LlvE DEcADE, http:/ /www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/iwrm.shtml, ("Most developed
countries have in large measure, artificially overcome natural variability [of water availability] by supply-side infrastructure to assure reliable supply and reduce risks, albeit at
high cost and often with negative impacts on the environment and sometimes on human
health and livelihood.").
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vital ecosystems.3 IWRM aims to integrate relations between surface
water and groundwater; quantity and quality; water systems and land
use; water and stakeholder interests; and between water institutions.4
Since the late 1970s, IWRM has been included in several international
declarations, for example: the Rio and Johannesburg Summits; international soft-law instruments like the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development; and international scientific forums such as the
World Water Forums. This has made IWRM part of the broader sustainable development approach. 5 The United Nations also recognized the importance of IWRM by passing Resolution 10967, making access to clean
and safe water a human right. 6 In practice, however, the legislative water
framework, investments in water infrastructure, stakeholder participation, and the use of planning and assessment tools are not targeted at
sustainable development per se.7
The International Union for Nature Conservation (IUCN)-a
global environmental non-governmental organization-endeavors to
make IWRM more sustainable through its Water Program.8 IUCN was
founded in 1948 and today has more than 1,200 governmental and nongovernmental member organizations. It is governed by a Council elected
by member organizations every four years at the IUCN World Conservation Congress. The Water and Nature Initiative (WANI) is a core element
in this program. WANI was launched in 2000 with the explicit goal of
implementing IWRM using an ecosystem approach within water basins.9
During the first phase, from 2001-2008, WANI featured a series of demonstration projects in twelve river basins in South-East Asia, Central
America, and Africa. 10
3. Id.

4. JEROEN WARNER, MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION PLATFORMS FOR lNrEGRATED
CATCHMENT WATER MANAGEMENT 2 (2007).
5. Roberto Lenton & Mike Muller, Introduction to lNrEGRATED WATER REsoURCES
MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: BETTER WATER MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 1, 5-8 (2009);
Olli Varis et al., Integrated Water Resources Management Plans: The Key to Sustainability? in
MODERN MYTHS OF 1HE MEKONG 173, 173 (2008).
6. U.N. EDuc., SciENTIFIC & CULTURAL 0RG., WATER: A SHARED REsPONSIBILITY. THE
UNITED NATIONS WoRLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1,3 (2nd ed. 2006).
7. Lenton & Muller, supra note 5 at 8-9.
8. lnt'l Union for Conservation of Nature, About the Water Programme, IUNC.ORG,
http:/ /www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/water/wp_about_water_prog/ (last updated Sept. 5, 2012).
9. IUCN, WoRLD WATER VISION (2003), lnt'l Union for Conservation of Nature, About
the Water Programme, IUNC.ORG, http:/ /www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/water/
wp_our_work/wp_our_work_initiatives/wp_our_work_wani/ (last updated July 9, 2012).
10. IUCN, WoRLD WATER VISION (2003); see also Int'l Union for Conservation of Nature
Water & Nature Initative, Project Results, WATERANDNATURE.ORG, http:/ /www.waterandna
ture.org/en/results/project-results (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
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This paper reviews the learning experiences of IUCN with water
management reforms in the Senegal River Basin in West-Africa during
this first phase. This basin is a valuable case study because it faces tremendous social, economic and ecological problems due to unsustainable
water management that sought to artificially control the availability of
water to the basin and artificially prevent salt water from entering the
Senegal River basin.U This article will demonstrate how IUCN has contributed to water management reforms in the basin. Furthermore the article will draw lessons for water management reforms in a broader sense
by examining the Senegal River Basin as a case study for the effectiveness of Phase 1 of the IUCN's WANI initiative.
Part II characterizes the hydrological and political situation in the
Senegal River Basin. Part III describes the water basin management history since the early 1960s-when the riparian countries became independent from France and started to seek cooperation. Part IV addresses
WANI-the strategies that WANI has used and their effectiveness in the
Senegal River basin. This section is based on primary and secondary
field information. 12 Part V discusses the role of IUCN in IWRM in the
Senegal River Basin's reform and the lessons that can be learned for
water management reforms in other countries.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIN

The Senegal River flows for 1,800 kilometers from Guinea,
through Mali, across the arid Sahel region-forming the border between
Senegal and Mauritania-towards the Atlantic Ocean (Figure 1). The
river's flow depends primarily on upstream rainfall in the Fouta Djallon
Mountains in Guinea (about 2000 mm/year)P The basin covers a surface
area of about 300,000 square kilometers. 14 The region has a distinct hot
and rainy season with sometimes extensive flooding from June-July to
October-November. 15 In years of high rainfall as much as 5,000 square

11. IUCN, WORLD WATER VISION (2003); See lnt'l Union for Consercation of Nature
Water & Nature Initiative, Senegal River Basin, WATERANDNATURE.ORG, http:/ /www.water
andnature.org/en/results/wani-basins/senegal-river-basin (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
12. IUCN, WAN! SYNTHESis: TECHNICAL SUMMARIES (2008); See generally FRANs M.
SMITH & M. CARTIN, iNTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL
REsoURcEs, WATER VIsiON To AcTioN: CATALYSING CHANGE THROUGH THE IUCN WATER
AND NATURE INITIATIVE (2011), available at http:/ /cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/final_
wani_results_reporUr.pdf.
13. DAVID FINGER & CRISTIAN TEoooRu, CASE STUDY SENEGAL RIVER 4 (2003), available at
http: I I fingerd.jimdo.com/publications I.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 4.

268

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

kilometers can be inundated. 16 The remainder of the year is dry and
hotP
Figure 1. Basin map. Source: OMVS (2003).

The delta near the Atlantic Ocean contains important wetlands,
including four Ramsar sites. 18 The National Park Djoudj (160 square kilometers) was established in 1971 and is one of the most important bird
sanctuaries of the world. 19 The park is famous for pelicans, flamingos
and migrating birds from Europe. 20 The Bassin du Ndiael (100 square

16. ld.
17. Id.
18. Ramsar Wetlands Int'l, Rnmsar Sites Information Service, RAMSAR.WETLANDS.ORG,
http:/ /ramsar.wetlands.org (follow "Ramsar Sites Database" hyperlink; search "Country"
for ''Senegal") (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). Ramsar sites are protected under the Convention
on Wetlands of International Importance, called the Ramsar Convention (Feb. 3, 1971).
19. See Ramsar Wetlands Int'l, Rnmsar Information Sheet: Djoudj, RAMsAR.WETLANDS.
ORG, http:/ /ramsar.wetlands.org/Database/SearchforRamsarsites/tabid/765/Default.
aspx (search "Country" for ''Senegal"; then follow "Ramsar Information Sheets and Maps"
hyperlink next to "Djoudj"; then follow "Most Recent Ramsar Information Sheet" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
20. Id. at 'II 22.
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kilometers) was established in 1977 and is also important for migrating
birds.Z1 The Guembeul National Reserve (7.2 square kilometers) was established in 1983 and is known for the protection of Sahelian mammals
and reptiles. 22 The Pare National du Diawling (156 square kilometers) in
Mauritania was established in 1994 and is an important wetland for
birds, protecting pelicans, black storks and flamingos. 23 All of these important national parks fall within the Senegal River Basin.
About 3.5 million people live in the Senegal River Basin. 24 The basin population is multi-ethnic with, among others, Peuls, Toucouleurs,
Soninkes, Malinkes, Bambaras, Wolofs, and Moors living there.Z5 Eightyfive percent of the basin's inhabitants live near the river and depend on
it for their livelihoods by fishing, farming, and livestock breeding. 26
Many migrate from these rural areas to large cities in the region and to
Europe to financially support their family members who remain in the
villagesP Some return during the rain season for seasonal work. 28 As
discussed below, the ethnic diversity in the Senegal River Basin caused
water conflicts after two major dams were built in the basin.
The water management of the Senegal River Basin is controlled by
the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal (OMVS). 29 Representatives from the four riparian states in the basin-Senegal, Mali,
Guinea, Mauritania-have a seat on OMVS.30 The political situation differs between these countries. In 2008 (when this study took place), Sene21. See Ramsar Wetlands Int'l, Ramsar Site Summary Description: Bassin du Ndiael, RAMSAR.WETLANDS.ORG, http:/ /ramsar.wetlands.org/Database/SearchforRamsarsites/tabid/
765/Default.aspx (search "Country" for "Senegal"; then follow "Summary Description"
hyperlink next to "Bassin du Ndiael") (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
22. See Ramsar Wetlands Int'l, Ramsar Site Summary Description: Gueumbeul, RAMsAR.
WETLANDS.ORG, http:/ I ramsar.wetlands.org/Database /SearchforRamsarsites/ tabid/765 I
Default.aspx (search "Country" for "Senegal"; then follow "Summary Description" hyperlink next to "Gueumbeul") (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
23. See Ramsar Wetlands Int'l, Ramsar Site Summary Description: Pare National du Diawling, RAMsAR.WETLANDS.ORG, http:/ /ramsar.wetlands.org/Database/SearchforRamsarsites/
tabid/765/Default.aspx (search "Country" for "Mauritania"; then follow ''Summary
Description" hyperlink next to "Pare National du Diawling") (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
24. Margaret J. Vick, The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective Look at the
Legal Regime, 46 NAT. REsoURCES J. 211, 212 (2006).
25. See Virpi Lahtela, Managing the Senegal River: National and Local Development Dilemma, 19lNr'L J. WATER RESOURCES DEv. 279, 282, no. 2 (2003).
26. Vick, supra note 24.
27. See Lahtela, supra note 25 at 288.
28. Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13.
29. Senegal River Basin Dev. Auth., Objectives of the OMVS, OMVS.ORG, www.omvs.
org/ fr I omvs/ objectifs.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
30. Senegal River Basin Dev. Auth., OMVS Member States, OMVS.ORG, www.omvs.org/
fr/omvs/membres.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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gal and Mali, both electoral democracies, were considered free countries
regarding political rights and civilliberties. 31 Mauritania, also an electo-.
ral democracy, was considered partly free though and Guinea, not an
electoral democracy, was considered not free. 32 Concomitantly, one can
expect differences between the countries with respect to institutional capacities, strength of the civil society, and the degree of participation in
water management.33 The next section details these problems from a historical perspective.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
To better understand the water management challenges in the Senegal River Basin this section first describes the role of the water dams
and related social and environmental concerns. Next, this section explains how the Senegal River Basin Water Charter aimed to address
these concerns, and how a lack of participation prevented an effective
implementation of the Charter.
A. Building the Dams

When the four riparian countries in the Senegal River Basin
gained independence from French colonial rule in 1962 they started to
seek cooperation.34 1n 1963, these countries signed the Bamako Convention for the Development of the Senegal River Basin.35 This Convention
declared the Senegal River to be an international river and established
the Interstate Committee to oversee its development. 36 The Interstate
Committee ruled that the four basin states would have freedom of navigation and that no individual state could utilize the waters solely for its
own purposes.37 1n 1968, the Labe Convention created the Organization
of the Boundary States of the Senegal River (Organisation des Etats Riverains de Senegal, OERS) to replace the Interstate Committee. 38 It had an
31. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008, freedomhouse.org, http:/ /www.free
domhouse.org/ report/ freedom-world/ freedom-world-2008 I (follow "Country Reports"
hyperlink; then follow "By Statutes" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
32. Id.
33. Lahtela, supra note 25 at 288.; See generally MARINAS. OTTAWAY, DEMocRACY CHALLENGED: THE RisE OF SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM (2003).
34. UNITED NATIONS, OMVS, Senegal River Basin, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, in
THE 1sT UN WoRLD WATER DEvELOPMENT REPORT: WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE, 456
(2003).).) [hereinafter UN Water Development Report].
35. Id.
36. ld. at 457.
37. Margaret J. Vick, The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective Look at the
Legal Regime, 46 NAT. REsoURcEs J. 211, 212 (2006).
38. UN Water Development Report, supra note 34, at 456.
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ambitious mandate that not only extended to river projects, but to all
economic development in the region, and even to military matters. 39
The OERS collapsed in the early 1970s because of its broad scope,
its difficulties financing the water infrastructure, and the withdrawal of
Guinea from its membership. 40 In 1972, the lower riparian countries of
Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania decided to enter into two new conventions, replacing the previous ones. The first convention, the Status Convention related to the Status of the Senegal River, provided freedom of
navigation and collaboration on the use and development of the riverY
The second Convention established the Organization for Development of
the Senegal River (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal,
OMVS).42 The headquarters of this organization is still in Senegal's capital, Dakar.43 Although both conventions scaled down the ambitious goals
of Labe Convention of 1968, the new convention gave OMVS unusual
power regarding river management. For example, the OMVS decided to
construct the Diama and Manantali Dams at the first meeting in 1972 to
improve the water management of the Senegal River.44 During this meeting other important decisions were made: to improve the port at Saint
Louis in Senegal; to create a river port at Kayes in Mali; and to improve
the river for navigation, including canalization.45
A third agreement, the Convention Relating to the Status of Common Works was concluded in 1978.46 This Convention states "the rights
and obligations of the States joint owners are founded on the principles
of equality and equity.' '47 This legal regime was revolutionary because
Member States relinquished to OMVS their sovereign control, their ownership of the land, and the river works. 48

39. ARIEL DINAR ET AL., BRIDGES OVER WATER, 170 (2007); Vick, supra note 37, at 228.
40. Vick, supra note 37, at 211.
41. Convention Relative au Statut du Fleuve Senegal (Convention on the Status of the
Senegal River), Mar. 11, 1972, available at http:/ /faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/mul16004.doc.
42. OMVS Convention, Convention Portant Creation de L'Organisation Pour la Mise
en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal (Convention establishing the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River - OMVS), Mar. 11, 1972 (modified by the Convention portent
Amendement du 17 Novembre 1975), available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/mul
16003.doc.
43. OMVS, http://www.omvs.org. (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
44. Vick, supra note 37, at 230.
45. Id.
46. UN Water Development Report supra note 34, at 456.
47. Vick supra note 37, at 215.
48. Undala Alam, et al., The Benefit-Sharing Principle: Implementing Sovereignty Bargains
on Water, PoL. GEOGRAPHY 90, 96 (2009); ARIEL DINAR, ET AL., supra note 39, at 170; Vick
supra note 37, at 215.
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The 1972 Conventions were some of the first agreements in the
world for comprehensive river management.49 Since the 1950s, Senegal
had attempted to introduce large-scale irrigated rice-farming in the valley.50 The severe drought in 1972 provided the right moment for Senegal,
a regional leader, to convince the other countries to remake the valley
and pass these conventions.51 The progressive 1972 Conventions were
also a means to convince the international community and donors of the
benefits of rice-farming-whether it be for pragmatic or ideological reasons, or a combination of both. Other authors argue that after independence from France the idea of pan-African unity-laid down in the postindependence constitutions of the riparian countries-was decisive in
the countries' decisions regarding the institutional and physical infrastructure constructed on the Senegal River. 52
The Conventions made it possible for OMVS to build one of the
first major river works, the anti-salt Diama Dam at the mouth of the Senegal River at St. Louis. This dam, built between 1981 and 1986, was
designed to block saltwater from entering the delta, making irrigated agriculture possible. 53 During the drought years saltwater would penetrate
over 100 km inland, rendering the entire delta unsuitable for
agriculture. 54
Between 1982 and 1988, the OVMS built a storage dam in theremote area near Manantali in Western Mali on the Bafing, the main tributary of the river supplying about half the annual flow. 55 The dam was
designed to make year-round irrigation and navigation up to Mali possible and to produce hydropower. Production of hydropower started only
in 2001 when turbines were installed (with a loan from the World
Bank).56 The Manantali Dam has a capacity of 800 Gigawatt-hours for
nine out of ten years, it is the region's largest hydroelectric power
49. Vick, supra note 37, at 214.
50. Olli Varis et al., supra note 5; Adrian Adams, Social Impacts of an African Dam: Equity and Distributional Issues in the Senegal River Valley, 1 (2000) (Contributing paper to the
World Commission on Dams) [hereinafter Social Impacts of an African Dam].
51. Mamadou Mactar Sylla, The Role of Basic Community Organizations in the Manage-

ment of the Natural Resources of a Transboundary Water Basin - The Example of the Local Coordination Committees of the Senegal River Development Organization, 35-36 in STAKEHOLDER
PARTICIPATION 1N TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: SELECTED CASE STUDIES (Anton Earle
and Daniel Malzbender eds., 2006).
52. Undala Alam et al., supra note 48, at 94.
53. David Finger & Cristian Teodoru, The Senegal River Case Study, Seminar on Science and Politics of International Freshwater Management ETH Zurich, 10 (Nov. 2003),
available at http:/ /fingerd.jimdo.com/publications/.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 7.
56. FRED PEARCE, THE DAMMED: RivERS, DAMS, AND THE CoMiNG WATER CRisiS (1992).
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source.57 The total costs of the dam was 800 million U.S. dollars, borrowed mostly from Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait. 58
Both dams were inaugurated in 1992. During this event, the President Diouf of Senegal declared, "[t]oday, I am convinced that Africa will
win its fight."59 indicating how much the authorities were focused on
building dams to overcome the problems in the Senegal River Basin. For
them, the dams were the fulfillment of a dream: "[t]he West Africans
wanted to build their version of the High Aswan to master the river and
to remake the valley". 60 In realizing this dream OMVS did its homework.
It was reported that in 1976 more than 9,000 reports, articles, and text
had been written about the basin with subjects ranging from hydrology,
agricultural development, ecology and climatology.61 These included feasibility studies for the dams supported by the U.N. Development Programme and an environmental analysis funded by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID}. 62
It does not appear, however, that social and environmental concerns were anticipated. OMVS was praised as a progressive multilateral
organization. During the 1970s comprehensive environmental assessments were not common, which gave OMVS ample room to realize the
dams. 63 When the dams were built, no comprehensive assessments were
carried out, no alternatives were considered, and no protesters-scholars, NGO workers, and journalists-were heard. 64 Yet, soon after the
dams were completed social and environmental problems arose.
B. Social and Environmental Concerns

While the dams initially held out great hope, they also created
social-economic and environmental problems. These related to the
change of the basin's flood plain ecology from a salty and brackish
aquatic environment to low-flow perennial freshwater environment.65
Social-economic problems arose between foreign wealthy farmers who
established large-scale irrigation farms, and poorer local farmers. Only
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 252.
Id.
ld. at 252-53
Vick, supra note 37, at 222.
Id. at 222-23.
Id.

Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50, at 3; Adrian Adams, A Grassroots
View of Senegal River Development Agencies: OMVS, SAED (Mar. 7, 2000), www.internationalrivers.org/ resources I a-grassroots-view-of-senegal-river-development-agencies-omvssaed-2013 [hereinafter Senegal River Development Agencies].
65. UN Water Development Report, supra note 34, at 452, 454, 459.
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foreign farmers could get loans, sometimes disappearing after acquiring
the money. 66
The arrival of newcomers also resulted in violent ethnic conflicts.
In 1989, nomadic Mauritanian herdsman killed sedentary Senegalese
farmers triggering ethnic conflicts.67 When Mauritania shopkeepers in
Senegal were killed, tens-of-thousands Mauritanians fled from Senegal
to Mauritanian. 68 Also, in Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott, hundreds of
black people were killed, leading 70,000 flood-recession farmers to flee
from the Mauritanian side of the river to Senegal. 69
The dams also created environmental health problems. Soon after
completion of the Diama Dam people downstream along the river suffered a dramatic increase in waterborne diseases-such as intestinal parasite infections, malaria and cholera-because of the newly created pools
of freshwater. 70 Waterborne parasites also infested livestock, resulting in
an overall decrease in meat and milk production for the region?1
The dams also eliminated traditional flood recession agriculture
on the flood plain. 72 The local population practiced recession agriculture
for centuries before the dam was built.73 This is a low-cost production
system based on natural irrigation and fertilization, where crops (e.g.
sorghum, beans, and melons) are cultivated on the receding flood. 74 At
the same time, livestock was temporarily moved away from the floodplain to the highland pastures?5 The introduction of modern irrigation
for rice production and vegetable production-like tomatoes and onions- put an end to these practices. Although the farmers were promised the release of water from the Manantali Dam during the growing
season, the engineers at the dams were reluctant to do so, and not capa-

66. Finger & Teodoru, supra note 53.
67. A. Degeorges & B.K. Reilly, Dams and Large Scale Irrigation on the Senegal River:
Impacts on Manman and the Environment, 63 INTERNATIONAL JoURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
STUDIES no. 5, 527, 642 (2006); Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13, at 9.
68. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 67, at 642; Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13, at 9.
69. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 67, at 642; Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13, at 9.
70. Vick, supra note 37, at 217; Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13, at 12.
71. Vick, supra note 37, at 218; Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13, at 12.
72. See Nina Larsen Saarnak, Flood Recession Agriculture in the Senegal River Valley, 103
Danish journal of Geography, no. 1, (2003); Vick, supra note 37, at 218; see Social Impacts of an
African Dam, supra note 50.
73. See Saamak, supra note 72; Vick, supra note 37, at 218; see Social Impacts of an African
Dam, supra note 50.
74. Saarnak, supra note 72, at 102; Vick, supra note 37, at 218; see Social Impacts of an
African Dam, supra note 50.
75. See Saarnak, supra note 72, at 102; Vick, supra note 37, at 218; Social Impacts of an
African Dam, supra note 50, at 1.
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ble of handling large dams this way?6 Water was released in September-called 'natural floods'-washing away crops before they could be
harvested. 77
Mismanagement of the river brought along new problems. These
included degradation of native fish stocks available for independent fisherman (although the catch of other freshwater fish increased); loss of pasturage; loss of wood gathering for charcoal and construction from acacia
forests; and the disappearance of wetlands?8 Moreover, irrigated rice
projects were abandoned, causing further desertification in the already
arid river valley79 Needless to say, local farmers are the losers in this
game of great interests and power; and the bureaucracies, city-dwellers,
foreign investors, and companies being the winners.
C. The Senegal River Basin Water Charter

During the 1990s,local farmers and fisherfolk of the Senegal river
started to contest the top-down river management approach of OMVS. 80
Jaabe So and Adrian Adams led protests against the OMVS.81 Jaabe So
was a former seaman who returned to his country in 1973 and organized
farming groups in most of the riverside villages.82 Adrian Adams was an
American anthropologist and writer who became the eloquent voice of
the local people in their protests against OMVS.83 She depicted the situation in Senegal River basin as a tragedy in the making, stating "(o]ne
may recall the protagonists at the close of the first act: State bureaucracies triumphantly in the ascendant, with donors (and attendant companies) discreetly at their side; the people of the Valley a silent chorus; and
dam critics, like Cassandra, warning in vain.'184

76. Pearce, supra note 56.
77. Id.; A.M. sene, S. Bonin, & 0. Soubeyran, Watershed Regulation and Local Action:

Analysis of the Senegal River Watershed Management by a Regional Organisation and Public Participation, 4 Hydrology and Earth System Science Discussion, 1917 (2007).
78. Vick, supra note 37, at 218-19.
79. H. D. Venema & E. J. Schiller, Water Resources Planning for the Senegal River Basin,
20

61, 64 (1991).
80. See Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50, at 17; Senegal River Development

WATER INTERNATIONAL,

Agencies, supra note 64.
81. See Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50; See Senegal River Development
Agencies, supra note 64.
82. Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50; Senegal River Development Agencies,
supra note 64.
83. Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50; Senegal River Development Agencies,
supra note 64.
84. Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50, at 6.
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In 1992, a group of farmers and pastoralists associations issued a
manifesto which, among other things, asked the administrative
authorities:
In cooperation with peasant farmers' organizations, to regulate the artificial flood in such a way as to favor flood-recession farming and the reproduction of River fish. . . In
cooperation with peasant farmers' organizations, to evolve a
land grant and development policy that gives priority, first to
the present and future needs of River inhabitants, then to the
present and future needs of the inhabitants of the rest of Senegal, and which takes into account all possibilities for developing the land, not just irrigation.85
Initially, the protesters were not heard and eventually attacked in the
press by the authorities when they continued their protests in the following years. 86 Towards 1997, however, things changed. In that year, OMVS
created the Environment Impact Mitigation and Monitoring Program
(Programme d' Attenuation et de Suivi des Impacts sur l' Environment,
PASIE).87 PASIE received financing from the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, France, and Canada.88 One of its six subprograms
was the Monitoring, Coordination and Communication Program. It was
through this specific program that NGOs and local populations were
given a voice in the management of the Senegal River. It appears believe
the donors convinced OMVS to give a voice to the NGOs and local population. Local populations found their voice through two coordination
committees: the Local Coordination Committees (CLC}, and the National
Coordination Committee (CNC).89 The CLC consisted of local communities, associations and professional cooperatives, representatives of the associations of young persons and women, NGOs, and representatives of
administrative authority. 90 The CNC consisted of concerned ministries,
professional organizations, NGOs and the representatives of the CLCs.91
Both the CNCs and CLCs meet before the general meeting of the Permanent Water Commission (Commission des Eaux, CPE), an advisory committee of OMVS.92
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Social Impacts of an African Dam, supra note 50, at 17.
Finger & Teodoru, supra note 13.
Id. at 6.
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Sene, Bonin & Soubeyran, supra note 77, at 1924.
Id. at 1933.
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See id.
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The local protests led lawyers from Mali and Senegal to write the
Senegal Water Charter.93 The three states approved this charter in May,
2002 (Charte des Eaux du Fleuve Senegal). 94 By that time, Senegal and Mali
had become electoral democracies, whereas Guinea and Mauritania remained ruled by one party. The charter sought to allocate water
equitability among the different sectors-principally agriculture, fishing,
navigation, and power production-to protect the environment, and to
enhance public participation.95J'he charter contained a unique provision
intended to protect locals against competing water demands:
The guiding principles of any distribution of the River's water
will guarantee to the populations of the riparian States the full
enjoyment of the resource, with respect for the safety of the
people and the works, as well as the basic human right to
clean water, in the perspective of sustainable development. 96
The charter is partly due to the work of the international community as it is based on several international declarations. Among the general principles in these declarations is the principle of public
participation demonstrated by: Principle 10 of the Declaration of Rio on
Environment and Development (1992);97 Principle 6 of the Aarhus Convention (1998);98 and Principle 24 of the Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). 99 By incorporating these progressive principles of law, the Water Charter has become a leading example of cross-border integrated water management.
On top of PASIE and the Water Charter, the international community further supported the OMVS reforms. Under the leadership of the
World Bank, a new river basin project was started with a major contribution from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 100 The project aimed at
93. Interview with Jean-Marc Garreau, Regional Programme Coordinator of IUCN in
West Africa, and Amadou Matar Diouf, IUCN representative in Senegal (March 18, 2009).
94. Water Charter, Charte des Eaux du Fleuve senegal, (18 May 2002), available at
http: I /lafrique.free.fr I traites I omvs_200205.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (Rio
de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992), Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
available at http:/ /www.un.org/ documents/ ga/ con£151/ aconf15126-4.htrn.
98. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making,
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, June 25, 1998, available
at http:/ /www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf..
99. G.A. Res. 51/229, 'l[24, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (July 8, 1997).
100. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an independent financial organization
providing grants to developing countries and countries with economies in transition in
support of the global environmental agenda. GEF brings together 182 member govern-
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institutional capacity building, data and knowledge management (including monitoring), strategic planning, carrying out pilots, and the enhancement of public participation and awareness. 101 The GEF project
built upon, and further supported, the CLCs functioning. 102 At first
glance the Water Charter thus enhanced public participation.
D. Lack of Public Participation
In practice, public participation still remains a concem. 103 This is

partly an institutional problem. First, all members of the Council of Ministers are appointed by their governments, and are not accountable to an
electorate.104 Second, the Water Charter confirms that decisions of the
Council of Ministers are not subject to review. Third, local groups are
only represented in advisory bodies as observers, and only have the
right to be informed and to issue their opinion on programs already developed and applied by permanent bodies. This form of participation is
very restricted. In the specific case of the CPE, the authors conclude that
it favors big users over small users in the allocation of water and keeps
local organizations away from decision-making in water management. 105
There are a few more obstacles for participation. First, there is no
detailed plan for the implementation of the Water Charter. Second, local
populations lack sufficient education, information, and training to participate.106 For example, farmers are not informed about the quantities of
water expected to fall, the periods of rainfall, and artificial flood. Farmers
are then confronted with sudden and unpredictable floods that devastate
seeding. 107

ments, international institutions, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, What is the GEF, http:/ /www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
101. WoRLD BANK., SENEGAL RivER BASIN WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
PROJECT: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, ii, 5, (2001), available at http:/ /www.thegef.org/
gef/node/920.
102. M. M. Sylla, The Role of Basic Community Organisations in the Management of
the Natural Resources of a Transboundary Water Basin-The Example of the Local Coordination Committees of the Senegal River Development Organisation, in STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT-SELECTED CASE STUDIES 35, 39 (Anton
Earle & Daniel Malzbender eds.) (2006).
103. A.M. sene, et al., Watershed Regulation and Local Action: Analysis of the Senegal River
Watershed Management by a Regional Organisation and Public Participation, 4 HYDROLOGY &
EARTH SYs. SCis. DiscussioNs 1917, 1922 (2007).
104. Vick, supra note 37, at 232.
105. sene, supra note 103, at 1933.
106. Sylla, supra note 102, at 122-24.
107. sene, supra note 103, at 1935.
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Yet, as the OMVS concluded in a detailed analysis of the CLCs,
the CLCs (within the GEF framework) have become a permanent structure and an "undeniable potential for mobilizing and coordinating the
monitoring of environmental activities and for carrying out projects
within an atmosphere of sharing and participation with the population."108 It was in this atmosphere that IUCN stepped into the basin with
WANI.
IV. THE WATER AND NATURE INITIATIVE (WANI)

The IUCN Water and Nature Initiative (WANI) is an IUCN effort
to bring sustainable IWRM into practice. This section describes the strategies that this program has used and how effective these strategies were
in the Senegal River Basin. For the Senegal River basin two strategies
have been employed: Dialogue and Policy Framing. 109

A. Dialogue
In the Senegal River Basin, the Dialogue strategy brought together
communities, NGOs, OMVS, academia, and research institutions to develop a common understanding on stakes and participation strategies.
No such efforts had been made since the trans-boundary cooperation began in the early 1960s. The dialogue started in 2005 with three series of
knowledge sharing workshops, first between research institutions in
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea; second between civil society organizations; and third with OMVS Local Coordination Committees (CLC,
see above). 110 A follow-up regional conference was organized with scientists from universities and research institutions in Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea. 111 This conference was held on April 16-17, 2007 in
Dakar, Senegal. 112 During the conference, OMVS and the scientific community prepared a Memorandum of Understanding. 113 It included areas
of interventions and suggestions on how to develop collaboration. 114
Next, strategies were developed for an integrative study of the basin and
an environmental education program to learn about trans-boundary in-

108. Sylla, supra note 102, at 44.
109. M. SMITH & M. CARTIN, INT'L UNION FOR CoNSERVATION OF NATURE, WATER VrsroN
TO AcTioN: CATALYZING CHANGE THRouGH THE IUCN WATER & NATURE INITIATIVE, 45
(2011 ), available at http: II cmsdata.iucn.org/ downloads I final_wani_results_report_lr .pdf.
110. IUCN, WANI SYNTHESIS: TECHNICAL SUMMARIES (2008); Smith, supra note 109, at 30.
111. IUCN, supra note 110; Smith, supra note 109, at 30.
112. IUCN, supra note 110; Smith, supra note 109, at 30.
113. IUCN, supra note 110; Smith, supra note 109, at 30.
114. IUCN, supra note 110; Smith, supra note 109, at 30.
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terdependencies. 115 Universities and research institutions that were previously unaware of what the other was doing at any given time benefited
from the IUCN initiative.
Local communities and NGOs were also included in the Dialogue.116 IUCN helped local communities express their voice and organize themselves. Moreover, scientific knowledge and collaboration were
used to prevent manipulation of the Dialogue. 117 IUCN started with high
ambitions to achieve its goal: it organized the Dialogue within OMVS
institutional structure. There was, however, a potential pitfall in this
strategy: decisions within OMVS are completely state-controlled and
made by unanimity.U8 Individual states were therefore in a position to
block people's informed proposals within OMVS. For this reason IUCN
also applied another strategy to make the Dialogue less informal: Policy
Framing.
B. Policy Framing

Policy Framing is a strategy aimed at creating a concept, plan, or
system for establishing national water policies. In the Senegal River Basin, this strategy aimed at implementing the 2002 Water Charter. This
charter was based on several international declarations regarding public
participation in IWRM. 119 Initially the charter turned out to be a paper
tiger because of the centralized decision-making process·within OMVS.
It was established in a top-down manner and initially unknown to the
local communities, NGOs, civil society groups, scientists, business people, and even OMVS workers. 120 To inform them, IUCN organized workshops in each state, both at national and community level. The IUCN
also empowered the CLCs. 121 As explained above, the CLCs form the institutional framework for dialogue among stakeholders and with government. In theory they have a very important and wide-ranging
responsibility in natural resource and community development; in practice their role was limited. 122 As part of the Policy Framing strategy,
IUCN endeavored to improve this situation by establishing action plans
for the twenty-eight CLCs throughout the basin. These action plans de-
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scribed practical measures to implement the principles of the Water
Charter in practice and were formally approved by OMVS.
Despite the recent efforts of the IUCN the program still must
overcome more than thirty years of top-down approach of OMVS with
little room for public participation. This has led to a strained relationship
between OMVS and stakeholders, and local populations. 123 On the one
hand, by encouraging public participation locals are able to claim their
rights in IWRM. However, this is often not tolerable because the powerful elites are usually quick to stress the risk of instability that wouJ_d generate if the local people claimed their rights. 124 For this reason, OMVS
only wants to work together with "responsible and accountable" people
from civil society; they don't want protesters at their door. 125
On the other hand, the IUCN has had a positive effect on the relationship between OMVS and local populations. 126 IUCN encouraged
stakeholders to share information, and helped communities and stakeholders to articulate their vision on the management of the water resources in the basin. As a result, OMVS began to recognize its
weaknesses in addressing concerns of the riverside residents, and started
improving its working methods. A recent example is the interview with
OMVS representatives on public television. This was unique for an organization that usually works behind closed doors. All in all, the Water
Charter helped the OMVS to draw closer to the public.
V. DISCUSSION

This final section discusses the role of IUCN in the legal reform of
IWRM in the Senegal River basin and the functioning of government in
the riparian states. Lessons are drawn for water management reforms in
other countries.
A. Promoting Legal Reform in IWRM

The Senegal River case study shows a river basin which has been
regarded for several decades by the international water lawmakers as a
reference for innovation and development of advanced regulatory
frameworks for riparian states. Since the first convention, the Bamako
Convention in 1963, there have been top legal instruments that incorpo-

123. Id. at 1933-37.
124. Interview with Jean-Marc Garreau, Reg'l Programme Coordinator, IUCN W. Afr.,
& Amadou Matar Diouf, IUCN Representative, Senegal, in Istanbul, Turk. (March 20,
2009).
125. Interview with Jean-Marc Garreau, supra note 124.
126. IUCN, supra note 110.
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rate the latest tools and principles available. 127 The most recent example
is the 2002 Water Charter that is specifically based upon IWRM principles. Yet, in practice there is a clear contradiction between the text of the
innovative legal instruments, and the commitment for implementation
from the national and river authorities. This is not a surprise if we recall
the differences between the countries in the basin with respect to institutional capacities, strength of the civil society, and the degree of participation in water management. Such a situation cannot be changed easily
with simple assistance programs-like IWRM-from outside. Nevertheless, the Water Charter has been a vehicle for people to express their
voice, to organize themselves and to articulate their vision on the management of the water resources towards OMVS.
Over the last few years there has been a virtual explosion of literature on international governance and law formation that arise from the
activities and agreements of private actors, rather than from state controlled law-making in the form of treaty or custom. 128 This literature indicates effective legal reform can only become operative if it is inserted
into a 'double fold' process (Figure 2). This process starts with tradiFigure 2. The double-fold process in law making.

tional top-down methods of drafting and passing laws-including treaties and conventions-and are complemented by private citizen
initiatives at a local level, which can be understood as a bottom-up approach to law-making. In theory, this double fold process results in better implementation of a given framework-in this case IWRM-on the
ground. The Senegal River case study showed that IWRM principles are
127. Christiana Ochoa, The Relationship of Participatory Democracy to Participatory Law
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 5, 8 (2008)
128. Ochoa, supra note 127, at 8.
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not being delivered on the ground. This is due to an inadequate incorporation of substantive legal frameworks that is lacking sense and appropriation at the community and individual level.
Figure 2. The double-fold process in law making.
(Diagram provided by author).
One of the problems with the rule of law is the high rate of noncompliance, which can assumedly only be tackled at high enforcement
costs. The double fold process of legal reform is now generally considered a preferred alternative because it enhances citizenship as explained
below. However, since there are no general recipes for delivering a legal
reform process, it is unclear whether the starting point should be the
general framework or the bottom-up approach. In the Senegal River Basin this is not a problem because the legal framework-i.e. the 2002
Water Charter-is already in place and IWRM has become part of the
national legal systems of all the signatory parties.
Ideally, the individuals of the society acknowledge and benefit
from the legal instruments that are there for social development. At the
same time, in a nonlinear process, the notions and local practices have
already been taken into consideration when drafting the legal
frameworks that will govern the people's activities. Citizenship compliance is enhanced because some of their behaviors have been incorporated into the norm. The norm formalizes, and at the same time
enhances, those conducts which decision makers consider more beneficial for society. Ideally, citizens are encouraged to participate in the decision making process. Coherence in drafting transnational legal
frameworks, national and local implementation, and citizen participation
is crucial for an adequate and efficient application and implementation
of legal frameworks.
Water management in the Senegal River Basin is far removed
from this ideal situation. The process of implementing national and local
norms that comply with international obligations has just begun. What
does this mean for the NGOs like IUCN that are involved in water management? Donors often consider IWRM as something that can be quickly
created by funding NGOs and training them in the techniques of lobbying the government, administering funds, and reporting to donors. The
reality, however, is more subtle. Because it is needed to invest in longterm cooperation and trust, IUCN's real impact has been on the ground,
creating new spaces for communication between the elites and local people. Because of the political nature of the organization their lobbying
work has been very cautious, thereby also gaining the favor of the ruling
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elite. If this can contribute to the strengthening of the voices of the communities for respecting the rule of law in their respective countries, that
alone would be a huge victory-not only for the people but also for the
State.
B. Looking Beyond IWRM to the Role of the State

The level of development and the political stability of a country
depends on access to water. Water scarcity, internal conflicts linked to
water usage, floods or epidemics are factors that could undermine the
power and legitimacy of states. States should also protect their population against threats from population growth or climate change, by designing and developing policies, strategies and legislation related to the
sustainable management of water. The latter co-exists with the states objective of maintaining the foundations and the structures of power.
An important step to guarantee the access to water, at the international level, is Resolution 10967 of the United Nations General Assembly.
This Resolution recognized the access to safe and clean water as a human
right. Senegal and Mali voted in favor of this Resolution while Guinea
and Mauritania where absent during the deliberation. Senegal and Mali
now have the international obligation to promote, protect and fulfill the
right to access water in the trans-boundary basin. This obligation poses a
challenge and an opportunity for Senegal and Mali: the effectiveness of
the implementation of the right to water implies that the government
and power elites grant to the general population a minimum of access to
water in enough quantity and quality to assure their living standards.
States are playing a dangerous card here because guaranteeing the
human right to water empowers stakeholders and strengthens political
structures. However, if those minimum standards are not respected, the
state might be in jeopardy through rising levels of conflict, considering
the irreplaceable nature of water.

